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Equity for Whom? Defining the Reach of Non-
Literal Patent Infringement
Peter K. Schalestock"
Outright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of
infringement. To prohibit no other would place the inventor at the
mercy of verbalism and would be subordinating substance to form....
The doctrine of equivalents evolved in response to this experience.1
One need not be a prophet to suggest that today's [decision] will ...
make enlargement of patent claims the "rule" rather than the "excep-
tion. "2
Under modern case law, the doctrine of equivalents is thought of by
practitioners and the courts as simply a second bite at the apple for the
patent owner in attempting to prove infringement.3
[W]hatever role the doctrine of equivalents may have played in earlier
times ... today the doctrine is regularly used by patentees to seek
greater coverage for their patents than the patent statute grants.
4
The holder of a patent has a twenty-year monopoly on the
manufacture, sale, or purchase of the device or process described in the
patent.5 The doctrine of equivalents allows a patent holder to bring
an infringement claim against a person whose device is similar to the
patent holder's, but is not literally described by the language of the
patent. The doctrine originated as an equitable action to prevent fraud
* B.A. 1992, University of Washington; J.D. Candidate 1996, Seattle University School of
Law. I would like to thank the editorial staff of the Seattle University Law Review for helping me
refine this article. I am particularly grateful for the incisive comments of Catherine Romero
Wright, my partner on the winning team at the western regional round of the 1995 Giles S. Rich
Moot Court competition.
1. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1950).
2. Id. at 616 (Black, J., dissenting).
3. Clarence J. Fleming, The Doctrine of Equivalents-Should It Be Available In the Absence
of Copying?, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 233, 234 (1994).
4. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Plager, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3574 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1996) (No. 95-728).
5. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (West Supp. 1995).
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on patents by minor variation; it continues to develop through case law
and is not included in the Patent Act.6
After a series of divergent opinions, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC)7 has clarified the mode of analysis to be used
in equivalents cases, requiring an element-by-element approach.'
Additionally, in a bitterly divided en banc decision, Hilton Davis
Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co. (Hilton Davis),9 the CAFC
recently held that equivalents analysis is available in all cases; a finding
of equitable factors in the particular case is not required.1" The
Supreme Court has agreed to review the Hilton Davis case, marking the
first time in nearly fifty years it will speak on the doctrine of equiva-
lents. The CAFC is also examining the roles of judge and jury in
equivalents cases. Its recent decision in Markman v. Westview
Instruments" suggests that the court is quite willing to limit the
participation of juries in patent actions,' 2 and the Supreme Court has
agreed to review the case. If upheld, Markman could presage a return
of the doctrine of equivalents to its equitable roots by giving judges
complete authority to decide claims arising under it.
The doctrine of equivalents began as a tool creating judicial
flexibility to shield patent holders from piracy through minor variations
on their inventions.'3 Over time, two trends have transformed it
from shield to sword. First, plaintiffs have persuaded courts to allow
claims of infringement by equivalents even where there is no evidence
of copying or other fraud.14 Second, as juries have decided more and
more infringement cases, their sympathy for patent holders has had a
greater impact on equivalents cases.'"
Together, these trends have worked a gross distortion on the
doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine should not be used to extend
patent coverage, leaving the public unable to determine the exact scope
6. See, e.g., ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 215 (3d ed.
1994); Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 62 F.3d at 1560-61 (Nies, J., dissenting).
7. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, created in 1982, has jurisdiction over
appeals from all district courts in certain subject matter, including patent cases. 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1295 (West 1993).
8. See infra text accompanying note 52.
9. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3574 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1996)
(No. 95-728).
10. Id. at 1521.
11. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that construction of patent claims is a matter of
law for the judge), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct, 40 (U.S. Sept. 27, 1995) (No. 95-26).
12. See infra text accompanying note 126.
13. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
14. Hilton Davis is an example of such a case.
15. See infra text accompanying note 157.
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of a patent's claims. Instead, application of the doctrine should be
limited to cases where fraud or other equitable factors justify departure
from the patent's terms. Further, decisions on infringement by
equivalence should be made by judges in their equitable capacity, not
by juries.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief summary of the history
and present state of the doctrine of equivalents. It describes the
contents of a patent and the difference between literal infringement and
infringement by equivalents. This part then discusses the creation of
the CAFC and the uncertain course of that court's early decisions in
equivalents cases. Finally, this part presents the three issues at the
forefront of equivalents analysis.
Part II discusses the recent resolution of the debate over the mode
of analysis courts should employ in equivalents cases. It then describes
the debate among the judges on the CAFC and that court's ultimate
selection of a mode that circumscribes, at least slightly, the reach of
equivalents claims.
Part III explores whether there should be a threshold equitable
finding required to present an equivalents claim. This part describes
the arguments on both sides of the question, tracing the increasingly
strident debate among the judges of the CAFC. The discussion
concludes with a critical look at the recent Hilton Davis decision.
Part IV examines the relative roles of judge and jury in deciding
equivalents cases. This part describes the practical difficulties of
separating issues between judge and jury and the reasons for having
judges decide equivalents claims. Part IV concludes by discussing the
impact of Markman and Hilton Davis on juries in equivalents cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
A patent includes claims that delineate the specific aspects of the
device or process (such as shape, strength, temperature, or acidity),
aspects that set the boundaries of the invention to be protected.1 6
The legal rights of the patentee are defined by the claims, rather than
the specification, which is a technical description of the patented device
or process. 7 Literal infringement of a patent occurs when a person
makes something that falls within the scope of the patent claims.' 8
Because it is conceivable that a copyist could use the essence of the
patented invention while making minor changes to escape the literal
16. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 1984).
17. ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 516 (1992).
18. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
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language of the patent, the doctrine of equivalents provides that
infringement may be found if the accused device performs substantially
the same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve substan-
tially the same result as the patented device.19
The CAFC, created to provide uniformity and certainty in patent
law, has struggled to provide a clear application of the doctrine of
equivalents. After several years of debate, the court settled on a
requirement that to infringe under the doctrine, an accused device must
contain an equivalent for each element of a claim, rather than being
equivalent as a whole.20 Last year, the court issued en banc decisions
affecting two other major areas of uncertainty in equivalents interpreta-
tion: (1) whether the doctrine is available in any infringement case or
only upon a showing of equitable factors, 21 and (2) whether equiva-
lents claims are triable to a jury.
2
A. Summary of the Doctrine of Equivalents
By granting a patent, the government gives an inventor the legal
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented
invention for a limited period of time.23 The invention is described
in the patent by means of claims and the specification. 24  The
specification describes the device or process invented, 21 while the
claims describe the scope of invention.26 The claims define the legal
rights of the patentee.27
For example, a hypothetical claim for a simple stool might read:
"An object for sitting comprising a square seat of 3/4 inch plywood
measuring 15 inches on each side supported by four legs, wherein each
leg measures one inch by one inch and eighteen inches in length and
is attached at a comer of the seat.
' 28
19. Known as the Graver Tank function/way/result test, after Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
20. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
21. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3574 (Feb. 26, 1996) (No. 95-728).
22. Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116
S. Ct. 40 (U.S. Sept. 27, 1995) (No. 95-26).
23. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995).
24. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 1984).
25. The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112, calls for the specification to describe the invention and
the manner and process of making and using it in dear, concise, and exact terms. Id.
26. Id.
27. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
28. Those with patent expertise will recognize this as a gross oversimplification. It is
intended to be conceptually illustrative, not technically precise.
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A patentee who believes his patent has been infringed ordinarily
must show that the alleged infringing product or process falls within
the literal language of one or more patent claims.29 However, strict
application of this rule would allow infringers to escape liability by
making minor, insignificant changes to avoid the literal language of the
claims. In the example above, a functionally identical stool with the
legs offset one inch from each comer would fall outside the claim
language and not literally infringe. The doctrine of equivalents evolved
to prevent this unjust result.
The most recent Supreme Court case to apply the doctrine of
equivalents was Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air
Products (Graver Tank).3" The Court in Graver Tank set out a three-
part test requiring an alleged infringing item (1) to perform substantial-
ly the same function, (2) in substantially the same way, (3) to achieve
substantially the same result as the patented item.3 If each part of
the Graver Tank test is met, the infringer may be held liable even
though the infringing device is not literally described by the patent
claims.3 2
The doctrine of equivalents attempts to balance two competing
policies of the patent system. The first policy is the "notice function"
of patents, which gives the public clear notice of the metes and bounds
of the patent so that inventors may design around existing patents and
avoid infringement.33 The second policy protects the interests of the
29. Very specific claims make it relatively easy to obtain patent approval because they are
less likely to encompass prior inventions. While it is harder to obtain approval for broad claims,
their breadth makes it more likely that an alleged infringing invention will fall within their scope.
See MERGES, supra note 17, at 563 (vague claims increase de facto scope of patent); RICHARD L.
GAUSEWITZ, PATENT PENDING 11 (1983) (claim language must be broad enough to provide
adequate protection, without being so broad as to describe earlier inventions).
30. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
31. Id. at 608. The doctrine of equivalents first appeared in its modem form in Winans
v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
32. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607. The doctrine of equivalents has no direct statutory basis.
Section 112, paragraph 6 of the Patent Act (35 U.S.C.) refers to "equivalents thereof" in
describing the means-plus-function form of claim drafting. However, "equivalents" under section
112(6) deals only with equivalent structures, materials, and acts disclosed in the specifications and
is not related to the doctrine of equivalents. William W. Cochran II, Review of Selected Cases
From the CAFC Relating to Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents and Literal Infringement
Under Paragraph 6, 35 USC 112, 29 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 253, 273-74 (1989); see also Valmont
Indus. v. Rienke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043-44 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Section 112, 6, limits
the broad language of means-plus-function limitations in combination claims to equivalents of the
structures, materials, or acts in the specification. The doctrine of equivalents equitably expands
exclusive patent rights.").
33. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Paul
N. Katz, Note, The Federal Circuit, In Determining Whether Patent Infringement Exists, Is Divided
Over Whether To Utilize "As-A-Whole" Or "Element-By-Element" Analysis When Applying the
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patentee, preventing deprivation of patent benefits by unscrupulous
competitors "who appropriate the essence of an invention while barely
avoiding the literal language of the claims.
34
The CAFC is currently struggling to balance those competing
interests as it re-evaluates several important aspects of the doctrine of
equivalents. One commentator observed that "while the Federal Circuit
was created to favor certainty for the public and business interests, the
doctrine of equivalents was created to favor the interests of the
patentee. When those two forces-the doctrine of equivalents and the
Federal Circuit-collided, there was bound to be some excitement.
' 3S
There are indications that the CAFC is shifting its emphasis to
protection of the public over protection for patentees in balancing these
policy interests.36
B. Confusion in CAFC Decisions
In 1982, Congress created the CAFC to bring uniformity-and
hence predictability-to patent law.37  However, the CAFC's early
doctrine of equivalents cases generated considerable confusion.
Lamenting the varying results achieved by different panels, one critic
of the CAFC noted that "[r]eplacing the many appellate courts by one
court wherein each case is heard by one of 220 different panels of that
court, each panel applying its own version of an expansive doctrine of
equivalents, cannot be the certainty that Congress had in mind.
3
One of the CAFC's judges also showed concern over the different
outcomes produced by different panels, worrying that "interpretation
of the doctrine of equivalents .. .will continue to depend on the
selection of the panel. 39
Commentators have often called for greater consistency in the
CAFC's decisions, with one urging, "Until the guidelines are unified
either by the judiciary or the legislature, the equitable efficacy of the
Doctrine Of Equivalents, 30 S. TEX. L. REv. 441 (1989); Patents: En Banc Federal Circuit Hears
Argument On Doctrine of Equivalents and Equity, 47 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 442
(Mar. 17, 1994) [hereinafter Argument] (remarks of Michel, J.).
34. London, 946 F.2d at 1538.
35. Paul C. Craane, Comment, At the Boundaries of Law and Equity: The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit and the Doctrine of Equivalents, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 105, 111-12 (1992).
36. See Jean M. Barkley, Note, The Doctrine of Equivalents Analysis After Wilson Sporting
Goods, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 765, 781 (1993).
37. HARMON, supra note 6, at 617.
38. Ronald D. Hantman, Doctrine of Equivalents, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
511, 554 (1988).
39. Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, 959 F.2d 923, 923 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Newman, J.,
dissenting to denial of rehearing en banc).
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doctrine [of equivalents] will be lost upon those who most depend
upon its clarity: the innovative community."4
Confusion in the doctrine of equivalents revolves around three
primary questions: (1) What mode of analysis should be applied in
equivalents cases?, 41 (2) Should there be equitable restrictions on the
availability of the doctrine of equivalents?, 42 and (3) What are the
respective roles of judge and jury in applying the doctrine of equiva-
lents?43  The first issue has largely been resolved by the CAFC's
decisions in Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc. " and Wilson
Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates.45 The remaining
two questions were at issue in Hilton Davis.
II. MODE OF ANALYSIS FOR EQUIVALENTS CASES
An early indication of the philosophical split in the CAFC came
in its struggle to define the mode of analysis for equivalents cases. If
the doctrine of equivalents is applicable in a particular case, the manner
in which it is applied can have a considerable effect on the range of
equivalents it will ensnare. Though couched in terms of technical legal
analysis, the debate had much to do with how broadly judges wished
to extend the doctrine.
The dispute over the mode of analysis in equivalents cases
centered on two questions: (1) Should allegedly infringing products be
compared to patent claims element by element, or should they be
compared as wholes?,46 and (2) To assert the doctrine of equivalents,
must a plaintiff show a hypothetical patent claim47 that would both
(a) meet the requirements for issuance as if it were included in the
original patent application, and (b) encompass the allegedly infringing
product within its literal language?4"
In opting for the more restrictive element-by-element analysis, the
court effectively slowed the expansion of the doctrine of equivalents.
However, the court has declined to require plaintiffs to present a
hypothetical claim as part of their prima facie case.
40. Roy Collins, III, The Doctrine of Equivalents: Rethinking the Balance Between Equity and
Predictability, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 285, 308 (1992).
41. See infra part 11.
42. See infra part III.
43. See infra part IV.
44. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
45. 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
46. See infra part II.A.
47. A claim the patentee could have pursued during patent prosecution, but did not.
48. See infra part II.B.
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A. As-A-Whole vs. Element-By-Element
In an early CAFC case, Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States
(Hughes),49 the court used a comparison of products as-a-whole to
decide whether an equivalent existed. Several judges continue to hold
the view that this is the correct analysis."s Returning to the stool
example, this approach would require a determination of whether an
accused item meets the general description of being a level sitting
surface with vertical support. Conceivably, a cylinder eighteen inches
high and fifteen inches around would be an infringing equivalent under
this formulation.
Four years after Hughes, in Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand- Wayland,
Inc. (Pennwalt),"1 the court, en banc (by a 7-4 majority), stated that
the alleged infringing product must be compared to each of the patent
claims limitations.5 2 This element-by-element approach examines an
accused stool to see if it has the equivalents of a sitting surface fifteen
inches square and 3/4 inch thick, with a leg mounted at each of the
four comers. At a minimum, an infringing stool would have to have
distinct legs and a sitting surface. The Pennwalt decision established
element-by-element analysis as the law of the Federal Circuit,
effectively narrowing the doctrine of equivalents.5 3
Despite the widespread perception of disarray at the CAFC, and
occasional disagreements between the judges themselves, several
commentators have suggested that the cases using the as-a-whole and
element-by-element approaches can be harmonized based on their
particular facts and procedural postures. Some analysts suggest that
Hughes and Pennwalt can be reconciled because (1) the as-a-whole
analysis applied in Hughes may have been consistent with the element-
by-element analysis required by Pennwalt, and (2) in Hughes, the court
found the trial judge's equivalents analysis inadequate and performed
49. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
50. For details regarding the dispute among the judges of the CAFC, see Katz, supra note
33; Jo Anne Rosenblum, Note, Patent Law--Doctrine of Equivalents-Has the Federal Circuit
Dealt a Mortal Blow to the Doctrine of Equivalents?, 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 671 (1989);
Craane, supra note 35. Judge Newman has been a leading and consistent advocate of the as-a-
whole approach. See Gregory J. Smith, The Federal Circuit's Modern Doctrine of Equivalents In
Patent Infringement, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 901 (1989); Arthur R. Whale, Doctrine of
Equivalents Undergoes Scrutiny, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 24, 1994, at S24.
51. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
52. Id. at 936. A limitation in a patent claim represents a boundary of the invention. In
the stool example, having four legs is a limitation; so is having a square seat. The protection of
the patent monopoly is "limited" to square stools with four legs.
53. See Hantman, supra note 38, at 550.
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its own, so different legal standards applied. 4 Others argue that the
court is really analyzing the "functional cooperation""5 among parts
of the claim and comparing it to the "functional cooperation" among
parts of the accused product.16 Framed this way, the results of the
various cases are consistent.5 7
Indeed, the CAFC itself has taken some steps to harmonize the
as-a-whole and element-by-element approaches by indicating that the
term "element" means not only a single limitation in a claim, but also
a group of limitations making up a component of the invention. 8 So,
while there must be an equivalent in the accused device for every
limitation in the claim, the equivalent does not have to be in a
corresponding component. This approach is more flexible than a strict
element-by-element standard. If enough elements are combined, the
comparison is effectively between wholes.
Pennwalt is now the guiding precedent for the CAFC, 9 which
"has repeatedly stated, infringement requires that every limitation of a
claim be met literally or by a substantial equivalent."6
B. Hypothetical Claim Analysis
Pennwalt's requirement of equivalence in each element rather than
in the whole invention places a higher burden on plaintiffs. In Wilson
Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates (Wilson),61 the
CAFC introduced a novel analytical tool for evaluating equivalents
cases which, if mandatory, would place an even greater burden on
plaintiffs.
Traditionally, plaintiffs have been required to show that an
allegedly infringing device is an equivalent. Defendants were then
permitted to raise two affirmative defenses: (1) that a patent covering
the defendant's device encompasses prior art62 and therefore is
54. Smith, supra note 50, at 912-13 (Pennwalt did not overrule Hughes sub silentio); see also
Cochran, supra note 32, at 263 (Hughes consistent with element-by-element analysis).
55. "Functional cooperation" is the interaction between different parts of the claim. It takes
on the role of the "way" prong in the function/way/result test. Ronald E. Larson, Balancing the
Competing Policies Underlying the Doctrine of Equivalents In Patent Law, 21 AM. INTELL. PROP.
L. ASS'N Q. J. 1, 16 (1993) (analyzing 37 CAFC cases from 1983 to 1992).
56. Id. at 17-18.
57. Id. at 4.
58. Barkley, supra note 36, at 773-74.
59. "The court has emphatically reaffirmed the vitality of Pennwalt." HARMON, supra note
6, at 227.
60. Intellical, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
61. 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
62. Prior art is the term for the previous state of invention in the field.
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invalid,63 or (2) that the plaintiff is estopped by prosecution history
from claiming the accused device is an equivalent.64
In Wilson, Judge Rich6" combined all of these steps into the
plaintiffs prima facie case. He required the plaintiff to posit a
hypothetical claim that would encompass the defendant's device, but
not encompass prior art or be subject to prosecution history estop-
pel.6 6 The most dramatic effect of this framework is that it shifts the
burden of proof on the prior art issue by requiring the plaintiff to
incorporate it into her prima facie case as part of the hypothetical
claim.67  Because it raises the plaintiffs pleading burden, the Wilson
hypothetical framework has generated strong opposition from advocates
for patent plaintiffs.68 Subsequent cases, while approving of the
Wilson framework, have not mandated its use.69
63. In effect, the patentee would be seeking protection for a patent that was so broad that
it would not have been granted if sought. See HARMON, supra note 6, at 222-23 n.224 ("In order
to support a preliminary injunction the required finding of likelihood of success on infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents should include.., whether the range of equivalents ensnares
the prior art.").
64. During prosecution of a patent application, applicants may narrow the language of a
claim in order to avoid encompassing prior art. A plaintiff who did this cannot claim as an
equivalent something that would have been within the language of the originally proposed claim.
However, not every remark made during prosecution may create an estoppel; there is a distinction
between amendments to claims and remarks made to the examiner. HARMON, supra note 6, at
237. For a discussion of prosecution history and prior art in Hughes and Pennwalt, see Smith,
supra note 50, at 920-27. (Prosecution history estoppel also is referred to as "file wrapper
estoppel.").
65. Judge Giles Sutherland Rich was an author of the 1952 Patent Act, where he introduced
section 103's requirement that a patentable device be "nonobvious," replacing the previous
"invention" standard. He was appointed to the CAFC's predecessor, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, in 1956. He has been called "a national treasure" and "the preeminent patent
law expert in the world." See Charley Roberts, At 89, He Still Is a Superstar, LOS ANGELES
DAILY J., Aug. 9, 1993, at Al, A9.
66. Wilson, 904 F.2d at 684-85. One commentator noted that this framework is remarkably
similar to that for patent reissue under 35 U.S.C. § 251 and suggested that the availability of a
statutory substitute for the equitable doctrine of equivalents had strong appeal, although the
practical difficulties involved make abandonment of the doctrine in favor of reissue undesirable.
Craane, supra note 35, at 35.
67. Barkley, supra note 36, at 781 ("The reallocation of the burden of proof in Wilson is
a strong indication that the Federal Circuit would prefer the balance to shift in favor of the public
as against the patentee.").
68. See, e.g., Presentation of John F. Witherspoon in The Ninth Annual Judicial
Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 140 F.R.D. 57, 127
(1991).
69. Conroy v. Reebok Int'l, 14 F.3d 1570, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[Tlhe district court's
decision not to conduct a hypothetical claim analysis was not itself improper."); International
Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Hypothetical claim
analysis is an optional way of evaluating whether prior art limits the application of the doctrine
of equivalents.").
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III. THE EQUITABLE THRESHOLD
A. Development of the Debate
With the analytical guidelines largely settled, the role of equitable
factors in the doctrine of equivalents is now the major topic of
contention. Until recently, it was common for judges to consider
equivalents as a second step in any infringement analysis-a "second
bite at the apple" for plaintiffs who fail to prove literal infringement.70
The trend was described by one commentator as a suggestion by the
CAFC that district courts use the doctrine of equivalents "as a
common-sense tool to expand the literal scope of claims in any case,
regardless of the equities. '"71
In recent years, however, the CAFC has hinted that it may use
equitable factors to limit the availability of equivalents analysis.72
According to one analyst, the foremost issue for the decade in the
doctrine of equivalents is whether the CAFC will "require a patent
owner to make a threshold showing that 'the equities' are in its favor
before [the court] will permit the patentee to attempt to prove
infringement by equivalents. 73
The CAFC indicated that it was considering such a change when
it instructed the parties in Hilton Davis to brief the issue of whether a
finding of infringement by equivalents requires anything in addition to
the Graver Tank three-part test.74  An example of "anything in
70. Fleming, supra note 3, at 234.
71. Smith, supra note 50, at 903.
72. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
73. John E. Gartman, Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents: Gazing Into the
Crystal Ball, 3 FED. CIR. B.J. 299, 301 (1993).
74. Faced with increasing inconsistency in its panel decisions on equivalents cases, the
CAFC sua sponte ordered rehearing en banc for the Hilton Davis case. The court instructed the
parties to present arguments on three questions:
(1) Does a finding of patent infringement under the doctrine of equivalents require
anything in addition to the three-part Graver Tank test, and, if so, what?
(2) Should courts apply the doctrine of equivalents in every infringement analysis, or is
it discretionary in accordance with the circumstances of the case?
(3) Is the issue of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents an equitable remedy
to be decided by the court, or, is it, like literal infringement, an issue of fact to be
submitted to a jury?
62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3574 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1996) (No.
95-728). The closely divided court in the Hilton Davis rehearing illuminates the disagreement
over answers to these questions. The potential impact of the decision is especially significant
because of Markman v. Westview Instruments, a recent case in which the CAFC was strongly
inclined to limit the jury's role in patent cases. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116
S. Ct. 40 (U.S. Sept. 27, 1995) (No. 95-26).
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addition to the Graver Tank three-part test" would be a determination
of equitable factors.
Judge Lourie launched the debate over an equitable threshold test
in London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co.75 by calling application of the
doctrine of equivalents the exception rather than the rule.76 His
rationale was that the public must be able to rely on the language of
patent claims as a guide to the scope of protection, and making the
doctrine of equivalents a second prong of every infringement analysis
would destroy that reliance because an inventor could not determine
when he might be liable for infringement by equivalents."
This statement, albeit dicta, was the first indication by the CAFC
that the doctrine of equivalents might not be regularly available to all
who assert it." Since the London decision, the CAFC has suggested
in numerous other cases that equities should play a role in the
availability of the doctrine of equivalents.79 At least five CAFC
judges have cited Judge Lourie's statement with approval."0
The second issue in Hilton Davis was whether judges must apply
the doctrine of equivalents at the plaintiffs request, or whether they
may use their discretion based on the circumstances of the case."1
Some CAFC judges clearly believe that the doctrine of equivalents
75. 946 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
76. Id. at 1538. The debate culminated in the inclusion of this issue among those to be
briefed in Hilton Davis. See supra note 74. Judge Lourie emphatically affirmed a summary
judgment for the defendant where certain claims limitations in the patented system for securing
hanging clothes in garment bags were found to be entirely absent in the accused device. London,
946 F.2d at 1540.
77. London, 946 F.2d at 1538.
78. Gartman, supra note 73, at 302.
79. See, e.g., Valmont Indus. v. Rienke Mfg., 983 F.2d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1993); American
Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1954 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (non-
precedential); Illinois Tool Works v. Rawlplug Co., 975 F.2d 868 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (table, text
at 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17190) (non-precedential); Shat-R-Shield v. Trojan, Inc., 968 F.2d
1226 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (table, text at 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 23616) (non-precedential); Charles
Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg. Co., 962 F.2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Extrel FTMS v. Bruker
Instr., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (non-precedential); Slimfold Mfg. v. Kinkead Indus.,
932 F.2d 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
80. International Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., 991 F.2d 768, 774 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (Laurie, J., concurring); Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031,
1036 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Rader, J.); Extrel FTMS, Inc. v. Bruker Instr., Inc., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1945,
1948 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (non-precedential) (Rich, J.); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson &
Johnson, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1954, 1956 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (non-precedential) (Plager, J.); and Shat-R-
Shield, Inc. v. Trojan, Inc., Nos. 91-1388, 91-1389, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 9860, at *4 (Fed. Cir.
May 1, 1992) (Nies, J.); see also Gartman, supra note 73, at 305 (indicating additional approval
by Judge Michel).
81. See questions posed on rehearing, supra note 74.
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should be available only when warranted by equitable consider-
ations.8 2 Judge Plager summarized this position, stating, "[T]he
doctrine of equivalents is not an automatic second prong to every
infringement charge. It is an equitable remedy available only upon a
suitable showing. "83 Other judges have also sought to establish that
Graver Tank provides authority for equitable limitations on the
doctrine of equivalents. In Valmont Industries v. Rienke Manufactur-
ing,84 Judge Rader referred to the Supreme Court's desire to prevent
an "unscrupulous copyist" from escaping infringement by minor
variations as "elucidat[ing] both the purpose of the doctrine and the
type of conduct which triggers its application."" In International
Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Manufacturing Co.,6 the panel stated
that the Supreme Court in Graver Tank had accounted for "instances
in which the function/way/result tests may be satisfied, but the facts
may not justify the application of the doctrine of equivalents."8"
Strenuous arguments have been raised on both sides of this question,
with the argument often depending on whether the person making it
represents patent plaintiffs or defendants.
1. Arguments for Equitable Threshold
Encouraging inventors to design around patents is one of patent
law's most important goals, a goal that is fully supported by the
Federal Circuit. 8 By identifying slight improvements in patents that
only just escape the language of the claims, inventors make small,
incremental advances in technology that are critical to long-term
progress. These smaller improvements are far more attainable than
82. See supra note 80 for list of cases.
83. American Home Prods., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1956.
84. 983 F.2d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
85. Id. at 1043.
86. 991 F.2d 768 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
87. Id. at 774. Judges Nies, Lourie, and Clevenger issued the opinion per curiam. See also
Donald R. Dunner & J. Michael Jakes, The Equitable Doctrine of Equivalents, 75 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 857, 861 (1993) (Graver Tank involved copying rather than
independent invention and supports application of equitable considerations.).
88. Slimfold Mfg., 932 F.2d at 1457 ("Designing around patents is, in fact, one of the ways
in which the patent system works to the advantage of the public in promoting progress in the
useful arts, its constitutional purpose."); Atlanta Motor Accessories v. Saratoga Techs., 33 F.3d
1362, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("This is a clear case of an effort to design around plaintiffs patent
and the realistic issue is whether the effort succeeds," arguing by implication that successfully
designing around a patent's claims should not invoke infringement by equivalents); Dolly, Inc.
v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 16 F.3d 394, 400 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Moreover, Evenflo appropriately
designed around the claimed invention. The propriety of Evenflo's conduct lies in its creation
of a chair substantially outside the metes and bounds of the invention as expressed in the claims
and relied upon by the public.").
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major leaps that vastly outstrip existing technology. Making equiva-
lents universally available to infringement plaintiffs discourages
designing around patents. If inventors cannot be certain that staying
outside the language of claims protects them from infringement actions,
they will not risk modest advances. Technological progress is thwarted
as a result. This result would directly contravene the constitutional
purpose of the patent system, which is to "promote the progress of.
the useful arts."89
Additionally, the Patent Act clearly sets out the protection given
to patentees, and absent compelling equities, plaintiffs should be
confined to the statutory protections. Judge Lourie echoed these
sentiments in London.90 Another commentator agreed: "The bottom
line is that unless there are other factors which justify the intervention
of equity, patent owners, like other litigants, should be forced to rely
on remedies set forth in the statutes."9'
2. Arguments Against Equitable Threshold
An equitable threshold for the doctrine of equivalents could result
in different treatment for creators of identical ostensibly infringing
devices, depending on whether they arrived at the creation indepen-
dently or by copying the patent. "If a court is allowed to take into
account the morality of the defendant ... two purported infringers
may have different fates for making identical gadgets. '9 2 Proponents
of this view worry that an imitator might avoid having conduct deemed
inequitable merely by obtaining a good faith opinion of counsel, and
by using the opinion as evidence that he believed he was not infring-
ing.93
The other arguments advanced in favor of keeping the doctrine of
equivalents open to all plaintiffs amount to little more than statements
of preference for patentees' interests over the public's. These
arguments include claims that the doctrine is only "equitable" if it is
available to all patentees, not just those with the equities on their
side.94 It is also argued that satisfaction of the Graver Tank func-
tion/way/result test should create a rebuttable presumption that the
doctrine of equivalents applies, forcing the defendant to show
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8.
90. 946 F.2d at 1538.
91. Gartman, supra note 73, at 306.
92. Peter Blackman, Doctrine of Equivalents, N.Y. L.J., July 21, 1994, at 5; see also Smith,
supra note 50.
93. Blackman, supra note 92, at 5.
94. Smith, supra note 50, at 916.
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independent creation or the absence of copying.9 Both approaches
represent a choice to favor plaintiffs in infringement actions at the cost
of injecting uncertainty as to what conduct would constitute infringe-
ment.
B. The Possible Form of an Equitable Threshold
Any equitable threshold should clearly define the equitable factors
to be considered. Judge Lourie identified four possible factors in
International Visual Corp.:
(1) whether the accused infringer was an unscrupulous copyist or,
alternatively, someone who developed her product through indepen-
dent research;
(2) the closeness of the accused product to the claim language;
(3) whether the patented invention was pioneering; and
(4) whether the allegedly equivalent subject matter had been
disclosed but not claimed in the patent application.96
The first factor distinguishes between an inventor who seeks to
profit from another's patent by making minor changes to escape patent
liability, and one who seeks to advance technology through his own
efforts. Of the four factors, only this one considers the state of mind
of the alleged infringer. As such, this is the only factor that would
depend upon credibility of witnesses; the others could be decided with
reference to the patent itself and the state of the art in the field.
The second factor measures the qualitative degree of equivalence.
It is a check on uncontrolled expansion of the doctrine of equivalents,
and forces courts to consider whether the new invention is a significant
departure from the patented one.
The third factor grants a higher degree of protection to a
"pioneering" '97 invention than to one that was derivative of existing
technology. This factor rewards inventors who pursue major advances
in technology by broadening their protection on the basis that near-
equivalents of such advances are unlikely to be created by entirely
independent effort.
95. Cary W. Brooks, Equitable Triggers for Invoking the Doctrine of Equivalents, 76 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 220, 224 (1994).
96. 991 F.2d at 774-75.
97. A "pioneering" invention covers "a function never before performed, a wholly novel
device, or one of such novelty and importance as to mark a distinct step in the progress of the art,
as distinguished from a mere improvement or perfection of what had gone before." Boyden
Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 561-62 (1898). Examples of pioneering
inventions include the sewing machine, the electrical telegraph, and the telephone. Id. at 562.
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The fourth factor prevents a patentee from gaining protection for
broad subject matter that is not included in the material submitted to
the Patent Office for examination. Thus, this factor weighs against a
patentee who disclosed the technology used in the accused invention
in his patent application, but did not include it in the claims for that
invention. This consideration of technology that is disclosed but not
claimed is more appropriate to the application of the doctrine of
equivalents than to its availability. The fact that the accused invention
was disclosed, but not claimed, should not render equivalents analysis
unavailable, nor should the absence of disclosure strengthen availabili-
ty. Instead, courts should decline to grant any weight to the disclosure
of the accused invention in the patent application when considering if
the accused invention is an equivalent.
As an alternative to determining if the alleged equivalent was
disclosed, courts should consider whether the technology was foresee-
able at the time the patent was issued. Disclosure alone reflects merely
the quality of patent drafting. It does not differentiate between a
patentee who inadvertently failed to claim something and one who was
unable to foresee the future technology in question. Put simply,
"future advances cannot be known at the time a patent application is
filed, [so] it would be impossible to describe and claim them."98 The
inclusion of this factor would cause courts to consider the foreseeabiity
of the alleged infringing invention at the time the patent was issued.
Nondisclosure of foreseeable applications would weigh against
application of the doctrine of equivalents. Conversely, the fact that an
invention became possible only through subsequent technological
advances would weigh in favor of equivalents analysis.
The fair use doctrine of copyright law is an example of an
equitable doctrine evolving into statutory law. Fair use began as an
equitable doctrine, and ultimately was codified in the 1976 revisions to
the Copyright Act.99 The statute specifies four non-exclusive factors
courts should examine in deciding a fair use question.00 The fair
98. Larson, supra note 55, at 27; see also Craane, supra note 35, at 142.
99. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 1996).
100. The factors include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
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use factors could serve as a model for the development of a statutory
doctrine of equivalents that would establish a test based on equitable
factors for whether infringement by equivalents analysis is available in
a particular case.
C. The Hilton Davis Opinions
A narrow majority of the CAFC rejected an equitable threshold
requirement in Hilton Davis.'0 ' The court split 7-5, with a per
curiam opinion supported by a concurrence from Judge Newman. The
dissenting judges-Archer, Rich, Nies, Plager, and Lourie-included
four of the five who supported the assertion in London that there
should be limitations on the application of the doctrine of equiva-
lents.'0 2
The patent at issue in Hilton Davis described a process for
ultrafiltration, a system of purifying food dyes through osmosis. 10 3
In Claim 1 of the patent, two of the stated parameters of the process
were that it would operate at pressures of between 200 and 400 p.s.i.,
and that it would occur at a pH of "from approximately 6.0 to
9.0."104 Warner-Jenkinson's process occurred at pressures in the
range of 200 to 500 p.s.i. and a pH of approximately 5.0.05
At trial, the jury found infringement based on the doctrine of
equivalents." 6 The CAFC affirmed the jury's findings. According
to the court, "[A] finding of infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents requires proof of insubstantial differences between the claimed and
accused products or processes."' 0 7  The court found substantial
evidence to support the finding that the differences in pressure and pH
(among others) were insubstantial.1 8
According to the CAFC, a finding of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents requires "insubstantial differences" in addition
to the Graver Tank function/way/result test.1' 9  The func-
tion/way/result test, according to the court, is part of the process of
A use that is "fair" based on these factors is not an infringement of copyright. Id. For a
discussion regarding the equitable origins of fair use, see Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
101. 62 F.3d at 1522.
102. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
103. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 62 F.3d at 1515.
104. Id. at 1515.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1521-22 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 1524-25.
109. Id. at 1521; see questions posed on rehearing, supra note 74.
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finding insubstantial differences; often, but not always, it is suffi-
cient. 1 ' In the CAFC's framework, evidence of copying or design-
ing around would be used to create inferences regarding the substanti-
ality of differences between claimed and accused products, not to
evaluate the availability of the doctrine.
The CAFC undermined its own position by attempting to relegate
the question of whether the defendant was a pirate to an evidentiary
question. "When an attempt to copy occurs, the fact-finder may infer
that the copyist, presumably one of some skill in the art, has made a
fair copy, with only insubstantial changes.""' The court continued,
however, stating that when "a competitor becomes aware of a patent,
and attempts to design around its claims, the fact-finder may infer that
the competitor, presumably one of some skill in the art, has designed
substantial changes into the new product in order to avoid infringe-
ment. 1112 These statements make intent part of the analysis, but for
the wrong reason. According to the majority, intent matters only
because it can be used to determine how close the accused device is to
the patented one. The majority leaps past intent as an equitable
matter, which is significant standing alone, and makes it substantive
evidence of infringement." 3
One reason for rejecting the equitable threshold is that "intent is
not an element of infringement.""' 4 Yet, the court would use intent
itself as evidence of whether two products are so similar that their
differences become insubstantial. In essence, the majority used the
same equitable factors some judges would use as a threshold to
determine the merits of the case. Conflating these equitable consider-
ations into the question of infringement itself muddies the distinction
between actual similarity of products-the existence of equivalen-
cy-and the need for relief to produce equitable results. The loss of
this distinction increases the number of cases in which courts must
consider infringement by equivalents because there is no mechanism
to exclude the claim if raised by plaintiffs, regardless of the factual
circumstances. Simultaneously, the loss deprives courts of a clear
means to analyze whether an infringement by equivalents has occurred.
110. Id. at 1518.
111. Id. at 1519.
112. Id. at 1520.
113. Intent to copy indicates infringement; intent to design around indicates non-
infringement; and independent development (absence of intent relative to the patent) has no
probative effect. See Ronald S. Laurie & Peter P. Tong, Federal Circuit Revises 'Equivalents'
Principle, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 23, 1995, at C42.
114. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 62 F.3d at 1520.
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The majority and dissent also engaged in a vigorous debate over
whether or not the doctrine of equivalents finds a basis in the Patent
Act. Both agreed that the historical practice was for courts to examine
whether the accused device was the same as, 115 or equivalent to, 116
the device described in the patent specification." 7 The majority
focused on the current statutory definition of infringement,"' observ-
ing that the statute does not refer to claims as the basis for infringe-
ment analysis. 19 Consequently, the majority asserted that the law
of infringement has not changed. 2 However, the case it cited for
this proposition dealt only with direct infringement.'' The dissent-
ers made the stronger argument that, by introducing as a requirement
claims that circumscribe the scope of the patent, Congress suggested
that infringement outside the claims must be based on judicial powers
of equity rather than the statute itself.' Congress must have meant
the claims requirement to mean something. If courts continue to allow
infringement actions against devices that are outside the claims on the
same terms as actions for infringement within the claims, the claims
requirement is significantly undermined.
Both the courts and the inventive community would benefit if
Congress made the statute explicit. This could be done either by
defining infringement to include making, using, or selling the invention
or its equivalent,' or by following the model of the fair use doctrine
of copyright law by codifying a series of equitable factors that may be
applied to determine whether courts may consider infringement by
equivalents.1 2
4
115. For direct infringement.
116. For infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
117. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 62 F.3d at 1526. Prior to 1870, claims were not included in
the patent, so the specification was the only way to determine the scope of the protected
invention. Id. at 1526; id. at 1537 (Plager, J., dissenting).
118. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995).
119. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 62 F.3d at 1526.
120. Id.
121. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961).
122. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 62 F.3d at 1560 (Nies, J., dissenting).
123. Thus validating the majority's view that the doctrine of equivalents is rooted in the
statute.
124. Thus validating the dissenters' view that the doctrine of equivalents is rooted in the
court's inherent power to do equity.
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IV. THE ROLE OF JURIES IN EQUIVALENTS CASES
Hilton Davis also raised the issue of what the relative roles of
judge and jury should be in deciding infringement by equivalents. 125
This issue affects several aspects at trial, including the determination
of whether the equitable threshold has been met and how the
function/way/result equivalents analysis is conducted.
A. Interpreting Claims As a Matter For the Judge
The CAFC recently decided that interpretation of claim language
in cases alleging literal infringement is solely a legal question for the
judge.' 26  The decision in Markman showed that the CAFC is
willing to severely limit the role of juries in infringement cases. In her
dissent, Judge Newman said the decision "eliminated" the jury.127
In his concurrence, Judge Mayer said the case was about "ejecting
juries from infringement cases. "128
The patent at issue in Markman was for a system that tracks
articles through the dry-cleaning process, thereby improving financial
record keeping and customer service. 29 The patented system could
identify the location of any article at any point in the process; the
allegedly infringing system only tracked aggregate transaction
totals. 30 The patentee argued that the term "inventory" in the
patent specification included not only articles of clothing but also cash
amounts of inventory.' 31  Under this construction, the defendant's
device might infringe, although it was undisputed that if inventory
meant only articles of clothing there would be no infringement. 3 2
The jury accepted the testimony of the patentee and his patent
attorney as to the meaning of inventory, and returned a finding of
infringement. 33  The judge granted the defendant's motion for
judgment as a matter of law, dismissing the jury's finding. 134  On
appeal, the CAFC, en banc, held that the judge was correct to treat
125. See questions posed on rehearing, supra note 74. Most of the oral argument in Hilton
Davis was devoted to this issue. Argument, supra note 33.
126. Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted,
116 S. Ct. 40 (U.S. Sept. 27, 1995) (No. 95-26).
127. Id. at 1000.
128. Id. at 989.
129. Id. at 971.
130. Id. at 973.
131. Id. at 973-74.
132. Id. at 974.




patent construction as a matter of law, and affirmed the judge's
construction of the particular claim. 3'
The holding that patent claims are fully integrated written
instruments to be constructed by the court had a solid majority behind
it, with eight judges joining the majority opinion and only two judges
disputing the holding.136 The CAFC rejected the comparison of
patent claims to contracts, preferring to treat them like statutes. 13 7
The CAFC gave several rationales for its choice of analogy. First, in
interpreting patents, courts are defining the federal legal rights created
by the patent document. 3 ' Second, a patent is unlike a contract in
that it does not derive its meaning from the intent of the parties.
Hence, there can be no inquiry into the subjective intent behind a
patent. 139  Third, patents are interpreted based on the public re-
cord-the patent and prosecution history, analogous to the statute and
legislative history. Patent examiners, like legislators and their staffs,
do not testify at trial as to their intended meanings. 40
The contract/statute distinction becomes critical when determin-
ing the admissibility of extrinsic evidence for patent interpretation.
Treating a patent like a statute means that the only appropriate use of
evidence outside the public record is to assist a court unfamiliar with
the terminology used. No inquiry into intent is undertaken, leaving a
jury with no evidence to weigh.
In the context of patent infringement, the power to interpret
claims constitutes virtually absolute power over the case. As Judge
Mayer said in his Markman concurrence, "to decide what the claims
mean is nearly always to decide the case."'' The CAFC has
unequivocally granted that power to judges in literal infringement
cases.
135. Id. at 970-71.
136. The majority consisted of Chief Judge Archer and Judges Rich, Nies, Michel, Plager,
Lourie, Clevenger, and Schall. Judge Rader concurred in the result but argued that it was not
necessary to reach the issue of who properly would construct claims. Id. at 998. Judge Mayer
concurred in the result but argued vigorously against the holding on claim construction, id. at
989-98, and Judge Newman dissented. Judge Bryson did not participate in the case.
137. Id. at 987.
138. Id. at 970.
139. Id. at 985.
140. Id. at 986.
141. Id. at 989.
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B. The Impact of Markman On Equivalents Cases
The strong statement of Markman suggests that judges might
receive similar authority in equivalents cases. The question of whether
a device accused of infringement performs the same function, in the
same way, for the same result as the patented device appears factual,
but it relies upon construction of the original patent to determine
whether the two are the "same." As a practical matter, once a judge
decides what the patent means for purposes of comparison, a jury's
power to decide the ultimate issue means little.
One analyst has suggested that the right to jury trial in equiva-
lents cases would survive based on overlapping factual issues between
the function/way/result analysis and "issues which must be sent to the
jury on literal infringement." '142 Now that the latter category has
been severely curtailed, however, the right to a jury in equivalents
cases is in doubt.
There are two stages in an equivalents case where the roles of
judge and jury become problematic. The first stage is the equitable
threshold (if one applies). Some of the possible equitable factors,
including intent to copy, are factual questions of a nature that might
be triable to a jury.'43 Nevertheless, a right to jury trial on these
factors is not guaranteed. Because there are no overlapping factual
issues between the equitable threshold analysis and the ultimate
question of infringement, there might not be a Seventh Amendment
right to jury trial on the threshold issue."'
However, if there is no jury trial available on the equitable
threshold, a mechanism must be designed to clearly separate the
threshold issues from those issues that a jury will decide in later stages
of the trial. Otherwise, issues will be tried twice. Equitable issues that
are triable to a jury must be insulated from subsequent issues that may
be prejudiced by the jury's consideration of them, as hearing evidence
on some equitable factors might prejudice later findings on infringe-
ment issues."' It is conceivable that two juries could be required,
one to try the equitable threshold issues, and another to try the
infringement issues.
142. Gartman, supra note 73, at 306.
143. See, e.g., Argument, supra note 33.
144. Id. To the extent that questions of claim interpretation are relevant in deciding
equitable factors (for example, the closeness of the accused product to the claim language), the
CAFC's decision in Markman dictates that there is no right to jury trial on those factors.
145. For example, a jury asked to consider whether there was intentional copying might be
prejudiced in favor of a later finding of infringement, even if it finds there was no intent.
[Vol. 19:323
Patent Infringement
While one commentator suggested a "gate-keeping" role for the
judge, his system would maintain a right to jury trial on the equitable
question of infringement by equivalents. 14 6 The factors that would
allow the judge to keep the trial from the jury are all substantive
questions relating to patent validity and infringement, 147 not equita-
ble issues bearing on the availability of equivalents analysis. Thus,
under this system, questions of equity, were they to be decided, would
still go to the jury. In effect, the proposal begs the question.
In the oral argument of Hilton Davis, the defendant's attorney
made a suggestion that Judge Michel characterized as a two-part trial:
a bench trial on the availability of the doctrine of equivalents followed
by a jury trial on infringement. 14  Judge Michel noted the potential
Seventh Amendment problems arising from overlapping issues of
fact. 49 If one issue related to the equitable threshold and infringe-
ment, it could not be decided once by a judge, and again later by a
jury.30 Because Markman limits the issues that must go to the jury,
Judge Michel's concern seems less important. The potentially
overlapping issues of claim interpretation are squarely within the
province of the judge to decide. As a result, the solution may be to
limit the jury's role in the infringement stage of the trial, rather than
limiting the judge's role in the threshold stage.
C. The Role of Juries Should Be Limited Further
The CAFC, in Markman, showed a willingness to limit the role
of juries in infringement cases.' Lamentably, it failed to push
further along that path in Hilton Davis. The majority in Hilton Davis
attempted to close the door on removing equivalents decisions from
juries by emphasizing the statement in Graver Tank that infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents is a question of fact.'3 2 However,
the Court in Graver Tank was concerned with the standard of review,
not the locus of decision-making. In fact, the trial in Graver Tank was
to a judge, not a jury.
146. Blackman, supra note 92, at 5. The proposed system is similar to the hypothetical
daims analysis discussed supra part II.B.
147. Prior art, prosecution history, estoppel, and enablement.
148. Argument, supra note 33, at 443.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See supra part IV.A.
152. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1543 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Plager, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3574 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1996) (No. 95-728).
19961
Seattle University Law Review
In his dissent in Hilton Davis, Judge Plager pointed out that the
characterization of a question as one of fact does not necessarily mean
that it is triable to a jury.113  He noted several types of equitable
actions in which judges decide factual issues."5 4 The majority did
not address the significance of the Markman decision for equivalents
analysis. However, Markman severely limited the scope of the
constitutional right to jury trial in patent cases. If Hilton Davis is seen
as protecting the right to jury trial in equivalents cases, it could have
the effect of making patent plaintiffs even more likely to seek a remedy
through equivalents because their cases will be heard by juries, whereas
under Markman, a literal infringement claim might not be.' If the
Supreme Court affirms Markman,"5 6 it will bolster the argument that
infringement by equivalents under modem claiming practice is
different from the infringement cases for which a right to jury trial
existed when the Seventh Amendment was adopted.
As a matter of policy, the need to rein in juries in equivalents
cases is manifest. In his dissent in Hilton Davis, Judge Plager pointed
out that "the reality is that the doctrine of equivalents is a virtually
uncontrolled and unreviewable license to juries to find infringement if
they so choose." '57 Given the freedom to do so, and unfettered by
clear guidelines, jurors-who surveys show strongly favor paten-
tees S--are prone to finding infringement given any opportunity.
The failure to impose even a judicial threshold--or preferably to make
equitable determinations of infringement by equivalents solely a matter
for judges-allows jurors to make equitable decisions properly left to
the judiciary.
153. Id. at 1543.
154. Id. Included were the rights of trust beneficiaries, mistake and fraud in contract
disputes, and domestic relations matters.
155. See also Laurie & Tong, supra note 113, at C42 (If a judge reaches a narrow claim
interpretation under Markman, a plaintiff will seek a jury trial for a finding of infringement by
equivalents under Hilton Davis.); William C. Rooklidge, Federal Circuit Unsettles Doctrine of
Equivalents, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 23, 1995, at C43, C45 (Hilton Davis "virtually ensures [plaintiffs]
can get patent infringement claims before a jury.").
156. Certiorari was granted on the question, "In a patent infringement action for damages,
is there a right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution
of genuine factual disputes about the meaning of a patent?" 64 U.S.L.W. 3201; see also Court Will
Consider Right to July Trial on Patent Claim Construction, 50 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
J. 607 (Sept. 28, 1995).
157. 62 F.3d at 1538.
158. Stephen B. Judlowe & Lee A. Goldberg, Jury Trials (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3929, Nov.-Dec. 1994),
available in Westlaw, 397 PLI/Pat 173, at *3.
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Allowing lay juries to decide patent cases also raises significant
concerns about a court's ability to correctly analyze and decide highly
complex technical issues. Nonetheless, the Seventh Amendment
guarantees the right to a jury in ordinary infringement actions.159
Equivalents actions, however, are equitable in nature, and may not fall
within the range of the Seventh Amendment's guarantees. Because
infringement by equivalents is an equitable cause of action created by
the courts, courts arguably have the right to structure the action as
they see fit-including deciding cases without a jury.
Allowing untrained juries to decide infringement without even the
relatively clear boundaries of patent claims to guide them invites erratic
and unpredictable outcomes based on emotion rather than reason.
16
Findings of infringement by equivalents should be limited to those
cases where the equities clearly demand them, and courts should make
those decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of equivalents is at the end of a transitional phase in
substantive content, with the mode of analysis used to determine
infringement by equivalents well established. The CAFC has set a
clear direction by affirming the element-by-element comparison of
devices and encouraging plaintiffs to hypothesize claims they could
have made validly at the time of prosecution, which are now infringed
by the defendant's device.
At the same time, the doctrine of equivalents is undergoing a
fundamental re-evaluation of its role in the patent system. Hilton
Davis purported to end the CAFC's internal debate over whether to
continue favoring plaintiffs by making the doctrine of equivalents
available in all cases without regard to equitable factors, but the bare
plurality of the holding and pointed dissents suggest that the debate is
not over. Indeed, it has now moved to the Supreme Court.
Perhaps even more important, the decisions in Markman and
Hilton Davis present conflicting views of the role of juries in equiva-
159. In the two centuries since the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, the amount of
scientific information potentially at issue in patent cases has exploded. Even many highly
educated and technically trained persons do not understand the issues involved in areas like bio-
engineering, where much of the current patent practice lies. The ability of an untrained jury to
provide justice in these circumstances is questionable. It might be appropriate to consider
impaneling juries of technically qualified persons in patent actions, but the constitutional
ramifications of such a step are beyond the scope of this Comment.
160. For a debate on whether jury trials in complex patent cases implicate constitutional due
process concerns, see Judicial Conference - Federal Circuit, 104 F.R.D. 207, 370 (1984).
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lents cases. Judge Newman said the Markman decision "not only
raises a constitutional issue of grave consequence, but the court creates
a litigation system that is unique to patent cases."' 61 That may be
its intent-to remove juries from the highly technical aspects of patent
cases. Such a step invites Supreme Court review for its vast implica-
tions for the patent system-and indeed, review has been granted.
At the same time Markman limited the jury's role, though, Hilton
Davis appeared to preserve it for equivalents cases. The combined
effect of the two cases is to turn the system on its head by giving juries
a greater role in an equitable cause of action than in one created by
statute.
It has been more than forty years since the Supreme Court last
spoke on the doctrine of equivalents in Graver Tank. It agreed to
review the closely divided Hilton Davis decision, and its guidance now
could do much to bring equanimity to the turbulent area of equiva-
lents.
161. Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 40 (U.S. Sept. 27, 1995) (No. 95-26).
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